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1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK	
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4	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,	: 09cr660
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6	-against-	:
7	3.	United States Courthouse Brooklyn, New York
8	BETIM KAZIU,	:
9	Defendant.	March 2, 2012 : 3:30 p.m.
10		X
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12	TRANSCRIPT OF SENTENCE BEFORE THE HONORABLE JOHN GLEESON	
13	UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE	
14	APPEARANCES:	
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2 (Open court-case called.) 1 2 MR. DRATEL: Mr. Stern could not be here. He had 3 surgery today. 4 THE COURT: Give him my best. MR. DRATEL: He wanted to be here. He didn't want 5 to delay what has been already delayed. 6 7 THE COURT: All right. Can I have appearances, 8 please. MR. ARIAIL: Shreve Ariail for the United States 9 10 with AUSA Seth DuCharme, Special Agent Stefanie Roddy with the 11 FBI and the others. 12 A VOICE: Michele Espinosa from the Probation 13 Department. 14 THE COURT: Thank you for being here. 15 MR. DRATEL: Good afternoon, your Honor, Joshua 16 Dratel for Mr. Kaziu. Also with me is Henry Steinglass and a paralegal from Mr. Stern's office, Mayerlin Ulerio. 17 18 THE COURT: Hello, Mr. Kaziu. 19 Are you ready to proceed, Mr. Dratel? 20 MR. DRATEL: Certainly, your Honor. May I go to the 21 podium? 22 Yes, come on up. THE COURT: 23 Obviously, there is an objection to the factual 24 recitations to the presentence report, I understand that. 25 Based on the trial record, that objection is overruled.

3 You've read the presentence report, obviously? 1 2 MR. DRATEL: Yes, sir. 3 THE COURT: Mr. Kaziu, have you read the presentence 4 report? THE DEFENDANT: 5 Yes. 6 THE COURT: There are a couple of addenda as well. 7 Have you gotten them and been over them with your client? 8 MR. DRATEL: Yes. 9 THE COURT: Is that right? 10 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 11 THE COURT: Have you had enough time to go over with 12 your lawyers the presentence report? 13 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 14 THE COURT: All right. 15 Before we turn to the more important business of 16 what the appropriate sentence is, anything you want to address 17 with regard to the presentence report? 18 MR. DRATEL: No, your Honor, just that factual 19 portion, paragraph 6 to 21, specifically, I guess, paragraph 10. 20 21 There's one specific fact that we raised with 22 respect to his intention to travel to Kosovo after his time --23 I'm sorry, to Macedonia to visit family after his time in 24 Kosovo. Other than that, it's pretty straightforward. 25 THE COURT: That one is not available to me.

4 1 MR. DRATEL: If you look at, I guess, exhibit to the 2 earlier letter of January, I think it's exhibit --3 THE COURT: I read your material. You're referring 4 to paragraph ten of the presentence report? MR. DRATEL: Yes. The last page, page 42 of the 5 6 initial sentencing letter points out with respect to paragraph 7 10, there is not any evidence that he fired a weapon while in 8 Kosovo. It also failed to mention that Mr. Kaziu intended to 9 10 travel from Kosovo to Macedonia to visit family and not to 11 Pakistan. 12 MR. ARIAIL: The government concedes that there was 13 not any evidence that he fired a gun in Kosovo. I think the 14 Macedonia point -- there is nothing wrong with that as well. 15 THE COURT: Let's strike that sentence, which is the 16 penultimate sentence in paragraph ten. 17 Everybody agree with that? 18 MR. DRATEL: Yes, your Honor. 19 THE COURT: And we'll add -- you can provide 20 language to Miss Espinosa regarding the intention to go to 21 Macedonia. 22 You can please add that to the presentence report. 23 PROBATION OFFICER: Yes. 24 THE COURT: Thank you. 25 Beyond that, anything else I need to rule upon with

5 1 regard to the presentence report or the addenda? 2 I don't believe so, your Honor. MR. DRATEL: 3 THE COURT: Do you agree? 4 MR. ARIAIL: That's correct, your Honor, we do 5 agree. 6 THE COURT: Do you want to be heard with regard to 7 the appropriate sentence? 8 MR. DRATEL: I do, your Honor. 9 THE COURT: Thank you for your submissions, both 10 sides, it has been very helpful. 11 MR. DRATEL: My intention, your Honor, is not to 12 repeat what is in the submissions because I know that you have 13 read them. 14 THE COURT: I have, but take the time you want and the time you need. 15 16 MR. DRATEL: I want to talk more about just in terms 17 of -- having thought a lot about sentencing, unfortunately in 18 this business we have ample opportunity to think a lot about 19 sentencing and, in particular, sufficient but not greater than 20 necessary from 3553(a), which I think is important not only as 21 a statutory standard but in this case is extremely important 22 as a benchmark in a case with such a wide range available to 23 the court for sentencing. 24 For me, the most difficult part -- trying to put 25 myself in the perspective of a court imposing a sentence, the

most difficult part, I think, would be trying to project into the future as to what someone will be like, what the defendant will be like a certain number of years from now.

So, what is sufficient but not greater than necessary to accomplish the goals of sentencing that are most relevant in this case?

Even taking the government's and the Probation

Department's presentence report's recommendation and the government's position, even giving them their due, deterrence and recidivism seem to be what both the government and the Probation Department are concentrating on with respect to Mr. Kaziu.

THE COURT: Recidivism meaning incapacitating?

MR. DRATEL: Yes, your Honor.

I think in that context, the concept of sufficient but not greater than necessary is obviously critically important in trying to project that into the future as to what the necessary sentence is and not anything greater than that.

So that a sentence, for example, of 30 years, like the presentence report recommends, I think would be much greater than would be necessary for that purpose if you look at the defendant, his age, his conduct and his level of maturity, his level of education, all of the things that I think will markedly change in the next 10 or 15 years in a custodial situation.

I think that that is what makes it difficult, but, also, I think that the sufficient but greater than necessary part of it requires the court to give the defendant the benefit of the doubt in that context.

So, in the sense that when you think about what is a sufficient sentence for those purposes, the world's is going to be a very different place in 15 years, I hope, and if it's not we'll probably have more problems than we know what to do with, but in that context it's going to be a very different world that he would be reentering.

All of that goes to the question of who he is now versus what he may be or what he will be in the future -- it's hard to project, again, but, again, I think you have to give the benefit of the doubt.

Looking at Mr. Kaziu as someone with really not -not under educated, but at least someone who has not taken
advantage of education, has not gone far in school, didn't
really complete a year of high school; twenty-one at the time
that these events occurred that he's being sentenced for
today, twenty-four now.

His maturity level -- I think the court knows from the evidence, from what you saw from the videos and other things, that regardless of intention and what they showed in that regard, just the full range of them, a kind of childlike quality that unfortunately is there that is going to be gone

8 within a range of time I think that will be well short of the 1 2 30 years that the presentence report recommends. 3 THE COURT: You're referring to those mob boss 4 videos? MR. DRATEL: Yes, other --5 6 THE COURT: Drug dealer video? 7 MR. DRATEL: I'm not sure if the court saw them. We 8 had proffered them. There were some with young kids, with 9 mirrors, but we never introduced those in evidence, but it's 10 just a certain level of interaction that was not adult in that 11 regard. Again, that will change long before we get to that 12 stage where both the government and the presentence report are 13 in terms of a sentence. 14 What the government and the presentence report also don't do is put this particular case and this defendant in the 15 16 context of a wide range of cases that have certain 17 similarities and a lot of dissimilarities. 18 The dissimilarities are for people who have received 19 the types of sentences that the government and the presentence report are recommending, people who actually did something 20 21 with a foreign terrorist organization, participated in a plot 22 more than what we have in this case. 23 This case is much more like those cases in which the 24 defendants received -- and some of them pled guilty and were

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capped at 15 years, but that was a government decision as to

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what they thought the reasonable sentence was, so that's part of the equation, too, in that sense because very few of those people were facing one count and pled guilty to the only count that existed in the indictment.

It was an equation reached by the government that -- and everybody knowing that the guidelines are going to max out beyond the statutory max, and everybody understanding when someone pleads to a crime like that that they're going to get a 15-year sentence, for the most part, but there are so many of these cases -- and we tried to present as many of them as we could catalogue -- that give a court a range that shows that this is not a one-size-fits-all type of sentencing exercise which I think, in the terrorism context, the government and the presentence report treat it as.

The guidelines do that in a way that the courts -the Second Circuit has already moderated in the context of
child pornography, which went through a long phase where it
was sort of in-for-a-penny-in-for-a-pound, there was no
gradation among defendants and conduct for purposes of
sentencing, but Dorvee has reversed that trend and now we see
a much wider distribution of sentences in that context.

I think here the same thing, the terrorism enhancements both lateral and vertical, is so extreme that it takes it out of the realm of ordinary cases and any kind of exercise of discretion within a guidelines range for the

court, and what you have are statutes that start at zero. One goes up to life, but the others don't, but you have such a wide variance in where it can fall and yet the guidelines and the government would like it just to be just one answer.

We know from Dorvee, we know from even cases the government cited like Stewart, we know that it's all along the range. Stewart initially got 28 months and then got ten years.

The co-defendant in that case, one codefendant who, was Abdel Rahman's right-hand man, passed messages to a foreign terrorist organization, the context of a 956 conspiracy because it was 2339(a), but --

THE COURT: Slow down a little.

MR. DRATEL: Sorry. According to the court that sentenced, he was fully aware of the context of what he was doing and designed to promote the agenda of a violent organization in Egypt that was dedicated to the overthrow of the Egyptian government through violence and was a part of that organization; he got 24 years.

Miss Stewart ultimately got ten years. The interpreter, who the court found and the jury found was a knowing participant who provided material support to a terrorist organization that was dedicated to violence, that had committed egregious acts of violence against civilians -- you know, not at the time that the conduct occurred but

11 shortly before -- he got 20 months, and that sentence was not 1 2 reversed and the court found that sentence reasonable. 3 So he was looking at 24. I think that is well 4 beyond -- when you look at the conduct of Sittar in that case it's well beyond the conduct of Mr. Kaziu here. There is a 5 6 grown adult mature person doing that. Here you have a kid in 7 what I would say is a state of prematurity, certainly, and I 8 think that all should have an impact on the court's sentence 9 and should militate for the kind of discretion that 3553(a) 10 provides even if the guidelines do not. 11 Like I say, it's the kind of situation that we've 12 had everything from child pornography to crack sentences, I 13 think that this deserves the same level of scrutiny and the 14 same level of moderation. 15 THE COURT: All right. 16 MR. DRATEL: I don't know if you have any questions. 17 I don't want to --18 THE COURT: I won't be bashful if I do. Thank you. 19 You have a right to speak. Anything you'd like to 20 say before sentence is imposed? 21 THE DEFENDANT: I wrote a letter. 22 THE COURT: Would you like me to read it or would 23 you like to say it out loud? 24 THE DEFENDANT: I'll say it out loud. 25 THE COURT: All right.

12 THE DEFENDANT: From here? 1 2 THE COURT: You can come up. 3 THE DEFENDANT: About three pages. 4 THE COURT: Take your time, take all the time you 5 want. 6 THE DEFENDANT: Begin? 7 THE COURT: Go ahead. 8 THE DEFENDANT: Dear Judge Gleeson, before I get a 9 sentence I want to make a few things clear. I just want to 10 bring to light that although I had certain beliefs or thoughts 11 I never reached the point of committing any violent act of 12 terrorism. 13 You only know what is apparent in this case but you 14 don't know what was going on in my mind or my intentions 15 before my arrest. I want to share some things that no one 16 knows about. Your Honor, you can only know -- you can only 17 judge me based on what you see I guess either in the evidence 18 or what the lawyer and the prosecutors say. That's why I want 19 you to know before I am judged in this courtroom what are and 20 were my thoughts in the past. 21 I see that since my lawyers weren't able to defend 22 me appropriately, and since Joshua didn't want to point out 23 certain facts of the case today because of the fear of causing 24 your judgment that supposedly you agree with the jury, it 25 might harm me if I go back to what happened or if I tell you

I'm innocent it might harm me in the sense that you might give me more time.

He told me that -- and I'm just paraphrasing what he said -- quote, we don't want the judge to think that you haven't repented the crimes or charges since he believes you're quilty.

While I believe that he's wrong because how I can be -- how can I be sentenced while many facts haven't reached you? I was never able to express to you my thoughts and feelings.

I admit that I have -- excuse me. I admit that I may have had certain radical thoughts and opinions but I never decided to go and kill or harm anyone in any way. If you look at where I was going and where my co-defendant ended up going, you will see that there was no plan to kill or harm anyone.

I ask you to look at my answers and not my words or the words of the individuals in the videos. I want to reiterate what would have been my last action.

Although I did say I purchased a plane ticket to Pakistan, it was a lie. Blerim Skoro bought that ticket without me being aware of it. He spoke to me about fighting jihad, killing American soldiers and committing illegal and violent acts.

 $I \ \mbox{made a decision to leave Kosovo that moment and } I$   $\mbox{didn't want any part of it.} \ \ I \ \mbox{wrote my sister saying that } I$ 

want to visit my relatives in Macedonia. That following day I asked a young friend of mine, Suhejb, to tell me how I can go. He directed me to a bus that was close by. I went and got information that the bus was soon going to leave for Skopje maybe about two days later.

No sooner did I go back to receive money for the trip at the bank, my credit card got stuck. I made some effort to try to get back -- to get it back but days later I was arrested.

With that said, I do regret that at one point I allowed myself to be influenced by these videos and individuals and I wish I never went down this path, but I ask you to sentence -- but I ask you to sentence me based on my actions and not my words or opinions that I had -- that I held at that time. I completely regret what I did in that phase of my life.

All I want to do after my imprisonment is to be able to care for my parents in their time of need and to settle down and get married and have family. This is the path my mother wanted to take and this is what I regret not doing.

If given a second chance, I will fulfill my mother's wishes. And I just wanted to mention also about what he said that I guess I need some time or -- to change, but I think that that's absolutely -- that's incorrect because I'm already changed and almost three years in jail is enough time.

15 THE COURT: You've changed how? 1 2 THE DEFENDANT: I mean, just my view on life. I 3 realize that life is so precious. I regret a lot of things I did in the past. I just want to go back home. 4 THE COURT: 5 Thank you. 6 Who wants to be heard from the government? 7 MR. ARIAIL: I'm speaking for the government, your 8 Honor. Obviously we set forth most of our arguments in papers 9 so I won't go over them in too much detail. 10 I will say that I think in this case, 11 notwithstanding some of what the defendant just said here, I 12 think the primary concern on the part of the government is the 13 need to protect society and the public. That's really what is 14 driving the government's recommendation in this case. 15 We have a defendant who, throughout the course of 16 this conspiracy --17 THE COURT: Forgive me for interrupting. 18 Mr. Dratel mentioned the government's recommendation 19 as well. I didn't see a recommendation. 20 MR. ARIAIL: We didn't actually make a specific 21 numerical recommendation, your Honor. We requested that the 22 court sentence the defendant at or near the guidelines of life. We took into account some of the factors that 23 24 Mr. Dratel raised. 25 THE COURT: My understandings is right, you didn't

propose a specific number?

MR. ARIAIL: I have not at this point.

THE COURT: Sorry to interrupt.

MR. ARIAIL: Throughout the course of this conspiracy, this defendant had a number of setbacks. He managed though at each and every time to sort of press forward to the ends of that conspiracy.

When his best friend didn't have enough money to buy a ticket to fly to Cairo, he put the money up for him, he bought the ticket and took him with him. When he got to Cairo, he set up a route to go to Somalia with an al Shabbab facilitator named Ahmed and when that fell through he quickly changed his course and he looked for another person to get him to the fatah.

His best friend in Cairo started having second thoughts and instead of telling Mr. Kaziu he hid the facts from him and he sought to go home because he was afraid of how Mr. Kaziu as going to react.

Ultimately, though, the defendant found out, and notwithstanding the fact that his best friend abandoned him in Cairo, he continued on; not only did he continue on, but he proposed to Mr. Hadzovic that they go and kill troops in Kosovo, presumably at Camp Bondsteel.

His friend left him behind and after he left him he continued to encourage him to return to wage violent jihad and

to continue with their criminal enterprise. Mr. Hadzovic ultimately came home and was approached by law enforcement and agreed to cooperate.

After Mr. Hadzovic left, Mr. Kaziu carried on the plot. He flew to Kosovo, he made a martyrdom video in which he declared he was imminently departing for Jenneh and he was set to fly to Pakistan to go to the fatah, to join with al Qaeda, to fight with the Taliban and to kill American soldiers there.

The only thing that stopped Mr. Kaziu was United States and Kosovo law enforcement. I can't tell you the resources that were expended by the United States government in order to track down this man as he headed off the cliff into the battlefield to go and kill the United States servicemen.

There's a row of federal agents and detectives from the New York City Police Department who spent hours, days trying to track him down and they did, and it worked and we stopped him. But I have to say that it was an extraordinarily successful event and it could have gone either way.

I think ultimately, if it hadn't worked, we would have read about Mr. Kaziu in the newspapers in a different way when he blew himself up in front of a base in Kosovo or was killed running a suicide mission in Afghanistan taking down a U.S. soldier. So that's the history of Mr. Kaziu and the

history of this case.

Since his arrest, as far as I can tell, up until today he has said nothing in the slightest to express any remorse for his conduct. During trial his demeanor suggested that he did not care about what was happening.

Defense counsel's letter, his submissions here, I think it speaks volumes in light of what Mr. Kaziu has said here this morning, in that what's remarkable about it is that there really is a lack of specifics about how Mr. Kaziu actually feels bad about what he did, about whether he accepted responsibility.

There is just nothing in that submission that tells you that he's accepted responsibility for his crimes and, based on the record as it stands, there's no indication that he's anything but a committed jihadist. So, any sentence that the court considers here I think has to take that into account.

We start with a guidelines sentence of life imprisonment. As I told your Honor, we did not say that the court has to sentence the defendant to life in prison, but it needs to be at or near life imprisonment because the defendant, I submit, based on the record, based on the facts, is still a committed jihadist and we have to protect the public from what he is capable of doing in the future.

His demeanor, his lack of responsibility, or his

unwillingness to accept responsibility -- here he claimed he was innocent today in spite of all the overwhelming evidence against him, all of that together suggests that the defendant should be incapacitated for an extraordinary period of time so that men and women who are serving in the armed services and our allies don't have to worry about Betim Kaziu going out and trying to kill them again.

The defense counsel talks a lot about the parsimony clause, about whether or not the sentence that the court should impose, what kind of a sentence is sufficient but not greater than necessary.

I think in this case any sentence that allows for Mr. Kaziu's release while he's still physically capable of attacking U.S. servicemen and women is not sufficient to achieve the requirements under 3553(a).

Mr. Kaziu is a danger to the public and unless he is put away for a long period of time I think there's a very high likelihood that we're going to see him again and we're going to see him again when he tries to attack someone, when he tries to kill someone again, when he goes out and fights on behalf of Islam against the United States.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Airial.

Anything further from you, Mr. Dratel, or from you, Mr. Kaziu?

MR. DRATEL: Your Honor, what came across my mind

hearing the government speak is whenever a judge or attorney is nominated for the Supreme Court or federal judgeship and they go before Congress, and Congress -- and the opposing side presents them, confronts them with something they wrote in college or in law school, invariably the answer is something to the effect of, "Well, I was young then. I was not as well informed. I had different a perspective then, but age and experience, both in life and my profession, has given me a different perspective now and that is not what I feel now."

And to freeze it in time right now I think is a huge mistake in human terms, in terms of what it means to sentence someone to the kind of term that the government and even the presentence report is asking for.

I don't think anybody is going to be in danger from Mr. Kaziu in 30 years, in 25 years, in 20 years, and less, but that is fine tuning it in terms of a specific number below that, but that's -- and the speculation as to sentencing him on the basis of something that is in the government's mind about what he would have done when there is nothing concrete in the evidence about something with a base in Kosovo or something like that, and to sentence him to additional time, significant additional time for that, I think it is inappropriate to make that argument in the sense that that is not a sentencing argument.

We sentence people for what they've done and to

project into the future in the context of deterrence, both general and specific, and in that context, again, I think that looking at it that way, the term horizon is significantly shorter and I think the court can do that with a level of confidence.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. ARIAIL: Your Honor, if I may just add one more thing?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. ARIAIL: In terms of my point earlier about sentencing the defendant to a period of incarceration long enough to prevent him from being a threat, I just wanted to note, in the Ressan case in California, the Ninth Circuit made a point when it sent the district court's decision back for remand and resentencing that it thought that allowing a committed jihadist out of jail at 53 was a serious problem in the district court's decision. I just wanted to point that out as something to think about.

MR. DRATEL: All I can say to that, which I said in my letter yesterday, my reply letter, there is zero evidence empirically, anecdotally or otherwise for that proposition which appears again and again, but it has no basis. Each case is individual.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Anything further from you?

THE DEFENDANT: No.

THE COURT: All right.

I want to say a little bit about the process that has brought Mr. Kaziu before me here today. From the moment you were arrested there was good reason to believe you were ready and willing and able to kill in the name of jihad and, indeed, that you had decided to do just that.

There has never been any specter in my view, having presided over the trial so I know a lot more about your case than a judge typically knows in imposing sentence, never been any specter that you're being prosecuted for harboring extremist political beliefs that happen to include an expressed hatred of your own country.

You got arrested, in my view, because you decided to kill in furtherance of those beliefs and the evidence, that included your martyrdom video and farewell messages, shows that you came pretty close to doing that.

From the moment you were arrested, our criminal justice system, in my view, was put to the test. By all appearances, including a lot of compelling evidence, you've devoted your young life to the cause of destroying this country and all it stands for.

I think how a government -- I don't mean just the executive branch when I say "the government," I mean our entire government, including its courts -- how it handles

criminal charges against someone bent on destroying it I think says a lot about the government itself.

You were appointed not one but two lawyers right off the bat. Seeing the nature of the charges against you and what was at stake for you -- and I'll confess, your youth had something to do with it -- it occurred to me it was very important to make sure you got the best defense our system could provide. So I added David Stern to the defense team right at the beginning.

Some of the best trial lawyers around,

Mr. Steinglass and Mr. Stern, asked for and received all the support, financial and otherwise, that a vigorous, excellent, independent defense of the charges required and should get in every case.

They were authorized to retain investigators, paralegals, interpreters, a consultant in foreign law, a jury consultant; they asked for permission and funding to travel to Europe and Canada, take sworn testimony from people you were considering calling as defense witnesses, and they got what they asked for.

When you complained to me about them on multiple occasions -- I'm sure you remember our meetings in the juryroom -- it was clear to me, and I shared this with you, that at the core of the problem was they were telling you things you didn't want to hear, and I told you patiently,

because in my view you had no reason to understand, that good lawyers frequently tell their clients things that the clients would prefer not to hear. You received disclosure from the prosecutors of an extensive amount of factual material that might assist in your defense.

I learned during this case -- this is the first case
I have been involved with that involved the Classified
Information Procedures Act -- and I learned that the
disclosure under that protocol is considerably more generous
as a practical matter than disclosure in other non-CIPA
criminal cases.

As the trial got closer, you wanted to retain another lawyer, Mr. Dratel. He is in fact another very good lawyer with considerable experience in this type of case. You couldn't hire Mr. Dratel yourself and as soon as I found that out I appointed him at government expense. That made three lawyers for your trial, a truly excellent defense team with deep experience in trying cases and in terrorism cases specifically.

The jury in your case was admonished over and over again that you were not on trial for your undisputed extremist political and religious views. I repeatedly told them that they could vote to find you guilty only if the government proved beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of the crimes charged; they couldn't allow your what I'm sure they thought

were repugnant political views to be a substitute for proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

The punch line is that at considerable public expense, and appropriate public expense, your rights have been scrupulously respected by the same government that you seemed determined to help destroy.

Our criminal justice system has plenty of imperfections -- I don't mean to suggests otherwise -- but if this case proves anything, it proves that those imperfections do not include a dilution of the rights of defendants charged with antiAmerican terrorism.

The process certainly doesn't end today. You have an absolute right to appeal both the jury's verdicts of guilty and the sentence I'll impose in a minute. You'll have first rate representation on appeal; if there were errors in your trial, and those errors were not harmless, you'll get a new trial. If the Court of Appeals agrees with your lawyers that there was insufficient evidence with respect to any of the charges, those charges will be dismissed.

I mention all this because I think it's critically important. A very important measure of a government is the extent to which it respects the rights of everyone even those -- especially those -- who despise it.

I found myself wondering from time to time during this case how you might have been treated if things were

reversed, instead of being an American who turned violently against this country, you had turned against the governments and other institutions that you close to align yourself with -- and there is really no dispute about the fact that you did that.

You grew up in Brooklyn and decided to murder your own country's soldiers. You and your coconspirator admired Osama bin Laden, and I wondered when I was sitting up here watching your trial, what if you had grown up over there in the Middle East and you were caught by al Qaeda plotting to kill members of that organization.

There was evidence that you admired this leader of the Chechnyan rebels, Emir Katab. What if you had grown up in Chechnya and Katab's people had caught you plotting to kill some of his rebels?

I don't purport to know the answers to these questions, but my instincts tell me that those organizations wouldn't have accorded you any protection at all, let alone the protections the American Government has accorded you before you came to stand there today.

I'm a judge more than seventeen years and I can't recall a case in which a defendant's acceptance of responsibility has the potential to affect the sentence as much as it has here in this case. There's an obvious reason that transcends this case, which is, we place a lot of stock

in acceptance of responsibility and genuine remorse -- so it matters in every case -- but here it could also shed useful light on who exactly stands before me.

I find, to tell you the truth, I find what unfolded here this afternoon fascinating. One wonders whether.

Mr. Dratel's pitch might have been different had he gone after you. I'm not going to intrude on what might be attorney-client communications, but it may well be he heard for the first time this, "I wish I hadn't gone down this path. I regret what I did," because, until you spoke, what was painfully clear to everyone who does this on a regular basis, from the submissions was something glaringly missing, and it came up in Mr. Dratel's oral remarks as well.

He was talking about your age and your conduct, and he even paused for a minute, and the thing he left out was your expressed remorse, your acceptance of responsibility.

There was no hint of it until you spoke.

We know for a fact that as a 19-year-old kid who failed miserably in high school you got swept up by jihad -- and I don't mean that to be disrespectful, when you get to be your lawyer's age you'll understand what I mean when I say you were a kid -- old enough to know better, old enough to be held accountable, but young enough for me to hope and even expect that long before today you'd be saying something along the lines of, "What have I done? What was I thinking? I'm so

sorry."

In the papers, the government argues that the big difference between you and your coconspirator Hadzovic -- Sulo -- the thing that justifies a much longer sentence for you than the sentence that will be eventually imposed upon him is that you were the ringleader of the plan when you left for Cairo.

I disagree with that completely -- not with their assessment that you were a ringleader, whatever that means in this setting -- but so what, you both went off to fight jihad. The big difference between you and him is he figured out it was all wrong. He showed genuine remorse. He confessed; he apologized; he pulled out, came home; told the truth. He got on the witness stand.

Mr. Dratel is right. A big part of the sentence is by looking into the future. I have to consider everything about you, including the need to incapacitate you. I don't have a crystal ball, it's a very difficult thing to do, and I can't see into the future, but I think it's fairly clear that Sulo no longer poses a threat of terrorist activity.

The hardest thing about this case is, what about you? You know, in the end -- I listened to you -- it's coming so late and you're protesting your innocence, there is still an element of defiance in you. I don't completely accept as genuine what you said. I don't think you shared it with

anybody until right now. I'm afraid it's opportunistic.

If you walked out the door right now, I have no reason to doubt at all, notwithstanding what you just said, that you'd try to pick up where you left off, maybe succeed this time. I really don't think that your resolve to commit terrorist acts has been diminished by 29 months in the MCC. It still leaves the question of when will it, will it ever?

You present yourself to me today as a young man who committed a deadly serious crime, who remains largely unrepentant. You still protest your innocence, you have a right to do that, but I have an obligation based on the facts before me to make my own fact finding, my own conclusions on which I'm basing your sentence, and I don't believe you.

I think your guilt was proved overwhelmingly, notwithstanding the excellent defense you got. My unhappy task today is to hold you accountable for the crimes you committed, which in and of itself requires punishment commensurate with the seriousness of those crimes, and crimes don't get a whole lot more serious than the ones you committed.

You made matters a little worse because the decisions you've made have placed before me the need to consider protecting the public from further crimes by you, and I intend to do just that.

We now have a one-shot sentencing system, sentences

get imposed and that's it, no second looks. It makes it so difficult to sentence. The system we jettisoned a quarter century ago allowed for parole commissioners to take a look after some time had passed to consider the need for continued incarceration, maybe the worthiness of parole.

We don't have that anymore. The Sentencing Reform

Act, which gave us the Sentencing Commission and these
guidelines, eliminated that. The sentence imposed is the
sentence served, less only good time.

So my great fear in imposing the sentence you deserve is that some day, maybe even some day soon, you'll wake up and you'll genuinely feel the things that you suggested here today; you'll understand how misguided these crimes were. That's my great fear, because then it's going to be too late, there will be nothing that could be done about your sentence.

At bottom, I believe that you're still way too proud of having become a jihadist. When the day comes that you wake up, then the prison term that you're going to serve will become very, very difficult for you, much more difficult than it will be until that day.

Who did I get that letter from, his cousin?

MR. DRATEL: Yes.

THE COURT: A heart breaking letter.

I am mindful of the supportive family, they were

31 1 here during the trial. It says something good about you. Ιt 2 breaks my heart that your relatives, some of the younger 3 relatives are beginning to forget who you are. 4 I have considered all of the factors in 3553(a), which pull in different directions, and reconciled them by 5 6 alighting upon a sentence of 27 years in the custody of the 7 Attorney General. The 27 years is imposed on counts one and 8 four. 9 Two and three have 15-year maximum; is that right? 10 PROBATION OFFICER: That's correct, your Honor. 11 THE COURT: On counts two and three, the term of 12 imprisonment is 15 years. All of the terms of imprisonment 13 are to run concurrent with one another. So it's a total of 14 27 years. 15 The term of imprisonment is to be followed by a 16 supervised release term. Each count gets a supervised release 17 term. 18 The presentence report says the maximum is five 19 years; is that right? 20 PROBATION OFFICER: We corrected it in the second 21 addendum, your Honor. 22 THE COURT: All counts? 23 PROBATION OFFICER: Counts one through three. 24 THE COURT: The supervised release term is imposed

for the rest of your life on counts one through three and for

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three years on count four. They run obviously concurrent with one another.

Are there special conditions that the Probation Department recommends?

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PROBATION OFFICER: Your Honor, we had recommended a search condition based on the nature of the offense and --

THE COURT: That is too far down the road. I won't do that. Any others?

PROBATION OFFICER: Not to possess a firearm, ammunition or destructive device.

THE COURT: There is the prohibition on the possession of a firearm, ammunition or a destructive device.

A hundred dollars special assessment on each count. They are aggregated so it's \$400 in assessments. There is no fine.

Is there a place you want me to recommend as close as possible to New York?

MR. DRATEL: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Granted.

MR. DRATEL: Thank you.

THE COURT: You have a right to appeal the jury verdicts in your case and you have a right to appeal the sentence I've just imposed. If you want to do that, you have to file a notice of appeal within ten days in this courthouse or you lose your right to appeal.

Mr. Dratel, you'll make sure a notice of appeal is

33 promptly filed? 1 2 MR. DRATEL: Yes. 3 THE COURT: If you can't afford a lawyer to 4 represent you on appeal, one will be appointed for you just as these lawyers were appointed for you. 5 6 You should file the notice, and I take it you'll 7 represent him on appeal unless something comes up in which 8 case you'll bring it to the attention of the Court of Appeals. 9 MR. DRATEL: Your Honor, I think that the trial team 10 should be relieved to give him a fresh start with a lawyer. 11 You heard today, we have all ratified decisions that we have 12 made in one form or another regardless of --13 THE COURT: Understood. I don't mean to suggest an 14 antipathy towards your motion to be relieved, but just as a 15 matter of procedure, you file the notice, make the motion to 16 the Court of Appeals and if in your judgment it's appropriate to have separate appellate representation, feel free to convey 17 18 my view to the Court of Appeals that your judgment ought to be 19 trusted. Thank you, your Honor. 20 MR. DRATEL: 21 THE COURT: Anything further? 22 MR. STEINGLASS: If there's nothing further from 23 anybody else, if I might? 24 Mr. Stern and I -- I didn't ask him this question, 25 but I do believe from my discussions with him, he and I would

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    ask your Honor to relieve the two of us at this point.
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              What's happened over the last umpteen months is that
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    since the trial --
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               THE COURT: Denied without prejudice to renewal
    before the Court of Appeals.
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              MR. DRATEL: I will make the motion on behalf of
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    everyone.
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              THE COURT: There is a presumption of continuity. I
    think there might be good reasons for that presumption to be
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    rebutted, but address that to the Court of Appeals.
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              Anything further?
              MR. ARIAIL: Nothing from the government, your
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    Honor.
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              MR. DRATEL: No, thank you.
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               THE COURT: Have a good day.
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